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Section I: Introduction 
 
James William Fulbright posited that the rapprochement of 
peoples is only possible “when the common bond of human dignity is 
recognized.”  Yet, to what extent is this true, especially for contemporary 
Sino-Indian relations?  The history of fractious bilateral ties between both 
countries suggests that the realities of conflict, rather than higher 
considerations of human dignity, contributed significantly to 
rapprochement – the re-establishment of cordial relations between two 
countries.1  In particular, this paper will argue that the implications of the 
Sino-Indian War in 1962 directly and indirectly brought about the 
rapprochement in bilateral relations that followed from 1970-1990.  
While it appears ironic that a war is seen as a turning point towards 
peaceful relations, it was indeed the case as this event chiefly 
demonstrated to both sides the impracticality of the Sino-Indian border 
dispute.  Moreover, the wider realization of the comparative 
insignificance of this territorial altercation drove Chinese and Indian 
leaders to seek both a more peaceful solution and more cordial relations.   
 
Section II: Background of the Sino-Indian War, 1962 
 
                                                      
1 In this essay, ‘rapprochement’ will be used interchangeably with ‘détente’.   





Fig. 1.1 Sino-Indian Northeastern Border and Disputed Territory2 
 
Hasty British withdrawal from India in 1947 left the disputed 
McMahon Line to serve as the de facto northeastern border between 
China and India. 3  It had questionable credibility as negotiations 
bypassed the Chinese government altogether and was thereafter 
forgotten till 1947, when a newly independent India declared the line as 
the nation’s official boundary.  Subsequent relations between China and 
India seemed cordial despite this, with the tacit acceptance of the 
McMahon Line as the relevant border and the establishment of the Five 
                                                      
2 Retrieved 30 July 2011 from 
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/8/8b/China_India_eastern_
border_88.jpg.1 
3 The McMahon Line was part of the Simla Accord in 1914 signed by the United 
Kingdom, Republic of China, British India and Tibet on the territorial status of 
Tibet. However, the Chinese withdrew midway through negotiations.  
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Principles of Peaceful Coexistence in 1954.4  However, two issues of 
contention quickly emerged which significantly strained Sino-Indian 
relations.  
The first issue was Tibet.  The Chinese perceived an Indian 
desire to turn Tibet into a “buffer zone,” carrying forward the “British 
Imperial Strategy.”5  In particular, Chinese military historian Xu Yan 
described Nehru’s granting of asylum to the Tibetan “splittists [sic]” 
including the Dalai Lama in 1959 as the “decisive factor” in worsening 
Sino-Indian relations.  Second, mutually exclusive and uncompromising 
territorial claims from either side also emerged when, in 1959, a clash at 
the area called Aksai Chin on the western border saw the death of nine 
Indian frontier guards.  India urged China to “adopt a reasonable 
attitude” while China asserted that India had “refused to hold 
negotiations” on the border issue.6  Indian Premier Jawarharlal Nehru’s 
idealistic vision of Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai fell apart and was in turn replaced 
by the more aggressive Forward Policy in 1961, which sanctioned the 
establishment of outposts behind Chinese troops that cut off their supply 
lines.7  
Relations continued to deteriorate with the strain of India’s 
Forward Policy and Sino-Indian differences over Tibet, as border 
confrontations ensued.  In accordance with the Forward Policy, Indian 
forces established the Dhola post north of the McMahon Line on the 
Southern slopes of Thag La Ridge in June 1962, further antagonizing the 
Chinese.  On September 8, 1962, 60 Chinese troops surrounded and 
intimidated the Dhola post.  In response, the subsequent directive to 
Indian Forces was “to fire on any armed Chinese who entered Indian 
Territory.”  In the words of historian Neville Maxwell, Dhola Post had 
become “as undisputably [sic] Indian as New Delhi itself.”8  These 
mutually uncompromising stances bubbled over into skirmishes on 
September 20, the official commencement of war.  Further Chinese and 
Indian offensives were carried out through October and November, 
before Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai declared a unilateral ceasefire in 
November.  
                                                      
4 The Five Principles of Coexistence was also known as Panschcila, and was 
codified in 1954 and meant to govern relations between India and China: Mutual 
Respect for each other’s territory; Mutual Non-Aggression; Mutual Non-
Interference in each other’ Affairs; Equality and Mutual Benefit; Peaceful 
Coexistence.  
5 John W. Garver, “The Indian Factor in Recent Sino-Soviet Relations,” The 
China Quarterly 125 (1991): 57. 
6 Ibid. 
7 This means literally “Indians and Chinese are brothers.” 
8 Neville Maxwell, “Sino-Indian Border Dispute Reconsidered,” Economic and 
Political Weekly 34, no. 15 (1999): 905-918.  




While Premier Zhou’s declaration concluded the major hostilities 
of the Sino-Indian War, its aftermath was an overwhelming defeat for the 
Indians.  Despite claiming territory North of the McMahon Line, they 
failed to protect and retain this area, instead retreating further South of 
the McMahon Line and into Bhutan.  A combination of weaker strategic 
positioning, poor preparation and communication, and sheer 
overconfidence led to this end.  Strategically, India lost Tawang, Walong, 
Thag La Ridge and all territory North of these three posts to the Chinese 
People’s Liberation Army (PLA).   
 
Section III: Implications of the Sino-Indian War 
 
The implications of the Sino-Indian War on Sino-Indian 
relations can be categorized into three discrete groups.  For India, it 
resulted in a re-evaluation of Indian foreign policy towards China, 
manifest chiefly in the abolition of the Forward Policy, and it additionally 
triggered extensive reform in the underperforming Indian Armed Forces.  
For China, it encouraged a correspondingly friendlier foreign policy 
towards India in response to unfavourable international perceptions.  
Collectively, the war demonstrated to both parties the impracticality of a 
relatively insignificant border dispute in relation to other national 
economic and security concerns.  
On the Indian front, the official history of the war, written by 
India’s Ministry of Defence in 1992, described the war as a “humiliating 
debacle” caused by “numerous tactical mistakes” and was recognized as a 
political failure.9  It can be gleaned that the proceedings and outcomes of 
the war had significant ramifications for Indian foreign policy.  The most 
apparent change was the abandonment of the Forward Policy, which set 
the stage for war in 1962.  Following the war, India realized that its 
provocative nature could not and would not be accepted without Chinese 
retaliation.  Nehru’s “assumption that China would not confront Indian 
troops and passively retreat” would never again be held, and in future 
would be “validated by accurate intelligence.”10  This harsh defeat caused 
Indian leaders to look much more respectfully at Chinese power, 
eventually leading to the resumption of border negotiations.  Hence, the 
Sino-Indian War saw the end of India’s overconfident and excessively 
aggressive Chinese foreign policy.  
                                                      
9 Prasad B. Sinha, Anil A. Athale, and Sri N. Prasad, History of the Conflict with 
China (New Delhi: History Division, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, 
1992). 
10 Garver, “The Indian Factor in Recent Sino-Soviet Relations,” 65. 
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Additionally, the war provided a stark reminder of Indian 
military weakness and in turn encouraged substantial military 
modernization. According to Indian military historians, much-maligned 
Indian Defence Minister Krishna Menon before and during the war 
attempted to “change the basic Defence posture of India”, by reducing 
dependence on imported armament.11 This was evident in the creation of 
the Department of Research and Development in 1958 along with the 
acquisition of firms such as Bharat Electronics in 1960.12  The outcome 
of the war made clear the fact that these changes had yet to fully mature, 
and that the Indian military structure was still in a period of transition.  
The war expedited this process of modernization, which was evident in 
the immediate establishment of the Department of Defence Production 
in the same year to “create a self-reliant and self-sufficient indigenous 
Defence production base.”13  This evidence corroborates the subsequent 
establishment of the Ordinance Factory Board in 1979, which today 
continues to produce a significant proportion of Indian Army ordinance.  
Thus, the tactical and psychological impact of the war saw India quickly 
develop a highly trained military force by the early 1970s, which 
demonstrated its prowess vis-à-vis its convincing victory in the 1971 
Indo-Pakistani war.  The significant modernization of India’s military 
would also later contribute to the process of rapprochement with China.  
On the Chinese front, China’s international image suffered 
despite a tactical victory for the PLA.  The American perception of an 
expansionist Communist state was confirmed, as she clearly saw China as 
the aggressor, though somewhat mistakenly due to the ambiguous nature 
of the border.14  Chairman Mao Zedong’s assertion that “the way to 
world conquest lies through Havana, Accra and Calcutta,” along with 
China’s first nuclear weapons test in 1964, did little to allay these 
concerns.  Moreover, Soviet pressure on the Chinese to accept Indian 
border claims served to further alienate China within the international 
community.15  American public opinion research conducted by the Roper 
Center for Public Opinion recorded a fall in positive responses to the 
statement “China as an anti-hegemonic force” in the immediate 
aftermath of the Sino-Indian war.16   This study further supports the 
                                                      
11 Sinha, Athale, and Prasad, History of the Conflict with China. 
12 Sinha, Athale, and Prasad, History of the Conflict with China. 
13 Ibid. 
14 James B. Calvin, The India-China Border War (Quantico: Marine Corps 
Command and Staff College, 1984). 
15 Yaacov Y. I. Vertzberger, Misperceptions in Foreign Policymaking: The Sino-
Indian Conflict, 1959-1962 (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984): 88. 
16 Hongying Wang, “National Image Building and Chinese Foreign Policy,” 
China: An International Journal 1, Vol. 1 (2003): 53, 56. 




claim that while the war was a strategic Chinese victory, it ironically 
translated into a Chinese defeat in terms of international public opinion, 
which would later add impetus to the rapprochement that followed.  
Most importantly, war brought both sides to the realization of 
the futility and unfeasibility of a border conflict.  The continued 
maintenance of extraordinary numbers of forces on the border was an 
unnecessary strain for two developing nations.  Furthermore, the 
inhospitable conditions of the mountainous borders also made fighting 
unrealistic in the long run.  India did not have the necessary 
infrastructure to maintain supply lines to the border posts in the 
northeast, and were neither sufficiently prepared nor experienced to wage 
a battle at high altitude.17  China, despite possessing the aforementioned 
infrastructure and high altitude military experience, incurred significant 
costs in transportation alone.18  Additionally, China had to divert 
resources from the Soviet border, incurring an additional opportunity 
cost due to an escalation in tensions as a result of the Sino-Soviet Split.  
 
Section IV: The Return of Hindi -Chin i  Bhai  Bhai , 1970-1990 
 
After the 1962 Sino-Indian War, there was an observed shift in 
Chinese and Indian foreign policy towards reconciliation from 1970-
1990.  The conspicuous gap of eight years between the war and 
rapprochement may be explained by fundamental shifts in military and 
diplomatic perspectives that required time to take root and produce 
tangible results.  These results occurred in three phases – implementation 
of Confidence Building Measures (CBMs), the re-establishment and 
improvement of diplomatic relations, and the institutionalization of 
efforts at solving the actual border issue. 
First, CBMs constituted the early signs of this new direction 
when in 1970, Mao Zedong made a “friendly observation” to the Indian 
charge d’affaires in Beijing that India was a “friend of China” and that this 
old friendship should be renewed.19   This was followed by Chinese 
cooperation in the search for two missing Indian soldiers at Chomolhari 
peak and the relaxation of Chinese “restrictions on Indian diplomats” in 
1971.20  These CBMs served as the prelude to the Sino-Indian détente in 
the next two decades.  
                                                      
17 Maxwell, India’s China War, 301. 
18 Ibid.  
19 China Report, “India-China Relations (May-September 1970),” China Report 
VI, No. 6  (1970): 75.  
20 Karki T. Hussain, “Sino-Indian Relations,” Economic and Political Weekly 6, No. 
38 (1971): 2021. 
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Next, a marked improvement in diplomatic relations facilitated 
the resolution of the protracted border issue and construction of cross-
border socio-economic links.  In 1976 ambassadorial relations were 
restored, leading to the first high-level exchange in 15 years – a visit to 
India by a delegation of the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship 
with Foreign Countries in 1978.  The opening of Chinese ports to Indian 
ships a year earlier concomitantly demonstrated a re-opening of 
economic links between the two countries.  This restoration culminated 
in Indian Minister of External Affairs Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s visit to 
China in 1979, the first ministerial meeting since Zhou’s 1960 visit to 
India.  Hence, by the late 1970s it was clear that progress, albeit of a 
largely symbolic nature, was being made towards the normalization of 
Sino-Indian relations.     
Finally, the evolution of diplomatic relations was followed by an 
institutionalization of efforts aimed at solving the outstanding border 
issue.  Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Huang Hua’s return visit to 
India in 1981 initiated a series of eight border talks beginning in the same 
year.  This marked the first conduit of official dialogue since the border 
conflict.  While the first three rounds of talks ended largely in a stalemate, 
they ensured continuing dialogue and the prevention of a fall back to the 
dearth of discourse characteristic of the 1960s.  The fourth round saw a 
turning point in negotiations, as there was a momentous consensus that 
talks would be conducted in a sector-by-sector basis, rather than an 
overall “package deal” as previously desired by the Chinese.21  More 
importantly, there was an agreement that normalization in other areas 
could proceed independent of the unsolved border issue, expediting 
bilateral cooperation in terms of science, culture and trade.22  The extent 
of rapprochement was further emphasized when talks proceeded despite 
the threat of perceived antagonistic posturing by both parties.  In 1986 
India granted statehood to the still-disputed area of Arunchal Pradesh, 
while in the following year a buildup of Chinese and Indian forces along 
the border at Arunachal Pradesh brought China and India to the brink of 
confrontation.  However, the fact that the seventh and eighth rounds of 
talks continued despite these two seemingly provocative incidents 
demonstrated a new maturity in the Sino-Indian relationship, along with 
its importance to both countries.  
 
While there was no absolute resolution of the border dispute as a 
result of the series of talks, there was nonetheless significant progress 
with regard to general territorial disagreements.  When Huang Hua 
                                                      
21 Sumit Ganguly, “The Sino-Indian Border Talks, 1981-1989: A View from 
Delhi,” Asian Survey 29, No. 12 (1989): 1128. 
22 Ibid.  




attended the celebration of Indian Independence in 1980, he expressed 
China’s neutrality on the Kashmir issue, one that was of vital importance 
to Indian external affairs.23  In response, Indian Prime Minister Rajiv 
Gandhi asserted that “Tibet is an internal affair of China” in 1988 on a 
visit to China.24  Moreover, the conclusion of talks saw the formation of 
a Joint Working Group on the border issue.  Compared with the 
previously held annual sessions, this group was a permanent standing 
committee, ensuring constant efforts at finding an appropriate solution to 
the border issue.  Therefore, this new phase of Sino-Indian relations was 
cemented towards the end of the decade, with the capstone of renewed 
non-aggressive military exchanges in July 1990.      
 
Section V: How the Implications of the War led to Rapprochement  
 
The observed rapprochement between 1970 and 1990 may be 
seen as a product of the implications of the Sino-Indian War in 1962.  
The removal of the Indian Forward Policy allowed tangible progress 
towards border resolution, while China’s desire to alter international 
perceptions meant a more conciliatory Chinese foreign policy towards 
India.  Strategically, reform in the Indian Armed Forces, coupled with an 
equally strong Chinese military, discouraged further incidents of 
belligerent military action by either party.  Most importantly, there was a 
collective realization of the unfeasibility of such a protracted border 
conflict, and this arguably catalyzed the search for a more amiable Sino-
Indian relationship, along with the establishment of governing principles 
in territorial affairs.      
An unsuccessful war on the basis of the abrasive Forward Policy 
effectively ended its existence, constituting the removal of a major 
stumbling block to border negotiation.  The Forward Policy asserted 
Indian military presence beyond the already disputed McMahon Line, and 
thus gave the Chinese no basis for a conclusive negotiation to border 
settlement.  Beijing lamented that a recognized border, if permitted to be 
changed at will by either side, would not “constitute a border at all,” 
providing no basis for negotiation in the first place.25  Hence, this 
important shift in stance on India’s part was in fact the pre-requisite for 
the commencement of the Sino-Indian border talk series in December of 
1981, and the subsequent formation of the Joint Working Group, both of 
which contributed to substantial Sino-Indian rapprochement. 
                                                      
23 Garver, “The Indian Factor in Recent Sino-Soviet Relations,” 67. 
24 Such as the granting of asylum to amongst other Tibetan separatists, the Dalai 
Lama, in 1959. 
25 Maxwell, India’s China War, 298. 
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Indian realization of internal military weaknesses on the back of 
the embarrassing defeat had two results for Sino-Indian relations.  First, 
the build-up of Indian armed forces served as a deterrent in China’s 
foreign policy, for the increased level of Indian military provision and 
preparation made China wary of ever attempting a similar defence 
strategy.  Resistance would certainly be stronger in the event of future 
military incursions, if not more effective.  These newfound fears were 
confirmed by India’s swift victory over Pakistan in 1971 and subsequent 
successful nuclear tests in 1998.  Correspondingly, the Indian bureaucrats 
and military commanders showed new restraint, as “Indian leaders… 
look[ed] much more soberly and respectfully at Chinese power” after the 
war.26  Such new attitudes were clearly demonstrated by the restraint both 
sides showed in the light of a threatening military build-up in the 
Sumdurong Chu valley in mid-1987.27   
The international community reacted negatively to China’s role 
in the war, and saw their actions as an exemplification of a “reckless, 
chauvinistic and belligerent foreign policy.”28   Despite achieving some 
measure of tactical success in 1962, China suffered a defeat in terms of 
public opinion, and desired to alter such disapproving views of her 
ambitions.  This Chinese desire to construct a more palatable image to 
facilitate her growing global ambition arguably encouraged the détente 
that followed from 1970-1990.  Academic Sumit Ganguly observed that 
the “Chinese have taken vast majority of the initiatives, ranging from the 
package proposal to the opening of Mansarovar and Kailash.”29  Indeed, 
the first diplomatic exchange after 1962 was a visit from China, while the 
renewal of economic relations also began with the opening of Chinese 
ports to Indian ships.  These Chinese initiatives clearly demonstrated the 
priority placed on relations with India, and moreover, the desire to 
construct a peaceful Sino-Indian friendship – a possible result of the 
increasing alienation and suspicion China received from the international 
community.  
 
Crucially, the unfeasibility of a border conflict deterred future 
possible confrontations and encouraged the normalization of relations.  
For India, the terrain was disadvantageous throughout the western 
border – the terrain, as described by Maxwell, was “broken and 
mountainous, and thickly jungled,” making troop and equipment 
                                                      
26 Garver, “China’s Decision for War With India in 1962,” in New Directions in the 
Study of Chinese Foreign Policy eds. Robert S. Ross and Alastair I. Johnston 
(Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2006). 
27 The Sumdurong Chu Valley was part of the disputed Arunachal Pradesh area.  
28 Maxwell, India’s China War, 423. 
29 Mansarovar and Kailash are important Hindu pilgrimage sites.   




movements exceedingly difficult and expensive.30  Despite this, Nehru 
and his top military brass proceeded determinedly with the Chinese 
confrontation, as he told journalists confidently that the advantage lay 
with India.31  This ultimately led to a humiliating loss, and a realization of 
the immense strategic limitations inherent in pursuing military-led 
approach to border re-negotiation.  On the other hand, the Chinese had 
come to see the limited border war as a liability in spite of pronounced 
advantages in terms of topography and terrain experience.  The Chinese 
had all-weather roads able to accommodate the largest military vehicles 
and equipment reaching within a few miles of the McMahon Line, along 
with extensive high-altitude experience from forays in Tibet in previous 
years.32  However, the eruption of the border war was contemporaneous 
with a twin security threat arising from the Sino-Soviet split and a more 
confrontational American stance with regard to Taiwan.33 This twin 
superpower threat worried China significantly more than the 
comparatively miniscule border war did.34  These two factors highlighted 
for India and China respectively the need for more peaceful resolution of 
the border dispute, opening the way for a fresh approach to reconciling 
general territorial disagreements.  
 
Section VI: International and Domestic Factors  
  
While the Sino-Indian War offers a convincing explanation for 
resultant developments from 1970 to 1990, consideration must be given 
to the evolution of domestic and external factors, which arguably 
augmented the process of détente.   
Domestic politics had important ramifications for the process of 
rapprochement, as regime changes reflected changing attitudes to Sino-
Indian relations.  In India, the victory of the Janata party in 1977 over a 
previously-dominant Indian National Congress saw a turnaround in a 
trend of frigid relations with China, coinciding with the first diplomatic 
                                                      
30 Maxwell, India’s China War, 301. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. 
33 On the back of the First and Second Taiwan Strait Crises in 1954 and 1958, 
there was an acute fear of a military flare-up especially with the continued 
presence of the American Seventh Fleet. Concomitantly, a result of the Sino-
Soviet split was a build-up of military personnel and aircraft along the Soviet 
border with China, from 12 divisions in 1961 to approximately twice that 
amount four years later, demonstrating that the Soviet threat was far more 
pressing than the Indian one. For more see 
Thomas G. Mahnken, “Current Sino-Soviet Military Relations,” Asian Affairs 14, 
No. 2 (1987): 93. 
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exchanges since 1962.  These actions may be seen as thinly veiled 
attempts at discrediting the Congress party and entrenching Janata rule by 
cultivating Sino-Indian relations.35  Similarly, in China, the purging of 
radical Maoists and the emergence of a new leadership consensus led by 
Deng Xiaopeng arguably sped up the process of rapprochement, 
independent of the implications of 1962.  There was a concerted push for 
economic modernization and a departure from Mao’s autarky, actions 
that possibly explain Chinese economic overtures to India, such as the 
opening of Chinese ports to Indian vessels in 1977.  This paralleled 
Deng’s trips to Burma and Nepal in 1978, suggesting that Indian détente 
was but part of a larger picture of “China’s turn outward,” grounded in 
the Chinese desire for economic progress.36   
Another factor that should be considered is the impact of the 
Sino-Soviet split on eventual rapprochement.  The deepening Soviet 
aversion towards China prompted China to seek much closer, if not 
peaceful, ties with India to prevent a situation of encirclement by 
unfriendly powers.  While this split may in some measure be explained by 
the pre-existing, underlying ideological tensions between the Soviet 
Union and China, it was nevertheless precipitated in part by the Sino-
Indian War, as tacit Soviet support for India prompted the ideological 
divergence to be “brought into the forefront.”37  The war in the first 
place surfaced worries of strategic encirclement, and was a vital element 
that caused the Sino-Soviet rift to “burst into the open.”38 
 
Section VII: Conclusion 
 
Though it is tempting to attribute the process of rapprochement 
to emerging international and domestic developments, these must 
fundamentally be seen as functions of the events of 1962.  Deng 
recognized the failures of Mao in 1962, discerning that the improvement 
of China’s economic and international standing would only be achievable 
with a less confrontational foreign policy towards India.  Similarly, the 
Janata party’s sea change in foreign policy must be seen as part of the 
desire to reverse the frigid state of Sino-Indian relations set by the 
Congress party in and before 1962.  Thus, even domestic changes in both 
countries were at least in part a response to the experiences of 1962.    
                                                      
35 Peking Review, “Indian general election and Soviet setback in South Asia,” 
Peking Review No. 14 (1977): 23-4. 
36 Garver, “The Indian Factor in Recent Sino-Soviet Relations,” 57. 
37 Rudolf Schlesinger, “Observations on the Sino-Soviet Dispute,” Science and 
Society Vol. 27, No. 3 (1963): 259. 
38 Mahnken, “Current Sino-Soviet Military Relations,” 93. 




While the Sino-Soviet split increased Chinese desire for the 
establishment of a new friendship with India, the same cannot be said for 
the reverse.  This factor cannot sufficiently explain the subsequent Sino-
Indian détente alone.  Therefore, the centrality of the Sino-Indian War in 
the evolution of Sino-Indian relations cannot be understated.  The war 
served not only as a trigger for rapprochement, adjusting mutual foreign 
and military policy in relation to the newfound realities emerging from 
the war, but also as a catalyst, contributing to the international and 
domestic factors that further augmented rapprochement between 1970 
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